An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tole rant taxonomic reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of epistemic independence can be studied in the framework of reasoning under uncertainty. It can be derived naturally using conditioning: "C is independent of A iff one's opinion about C is not affected by the fact of knowing A." Dually, we say that C depends on A if it is not the case that C is independent of A. A synonymous expression for "C depends on A" is "A is re levant for C'.
Traditionally, the formal basis of the dependence relation (also called relevance relation) is conditional probability:
Given two events A and C and a probability measure Prob, C is (probabilistically) independent of A iff Prob(CIA) = Prob(C).
In this paper we show that independence based on possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 , Dubois and Prade 1988) has quite different properties. We present three definitions of independence and study their formal properties. We call them unrelatedness, strong and weak independence. We show that strong independence has enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and we give a complete ax.iomatization not explicitly involving the underlying uncertainty theory. Then we apply these notions to the problems of belief revision and exception tolerant reasoning.
Throughout the paper A, B, C, D and E stand for events belonging to a Boolean algebra of subsets of a set Q.We use the symbols: conjunction A, disjunction v, and negation ..., . True and False are propositional constants denoting the true and false events respectively.
1 PROBABILISTIC INDEPENDENCE
1 The Multiplication Law
The standard definition of probabilistic independence is via the Multiplication Law: A and C are probabilistically independent iff Prob(AAC ) = Prob ( A) * Prob(C) . A priori we find it more natural to define independence as: C is probabilistically independent of A iff Prob(C I A) = Prob(C ) , relying thus on conditioning. In fact this conditioning-based notion of independence is equivalent to the multiplication law. It follows from the axioms of probability theory that independence defined in this way is a symmetric relation, and that it is not sensitive to negation. In other words:
(symmetry) If C is independent of A then A is independent of C.
(negation)
If C is independent of A then C IS independent of ..., A.
Symmetry justifies to say "A and C are independent"
instead of "A is independent of C". Moreover we have (truth) A and True are independent.
Note that there are no such simple properties governing the interplay of independence with conjunction and disjunction.
The above properties are not enough to completely characterize the notion of probabilistic independence. To get completeness we need two more axioms (Kolmogorov 1956 ), cited in (Fine 1973) : Hence the ax.iomatisation of dependence involves not only logical truth, but also a qualitative probability relation "�". It follows that -at least for the simple definition via conditioning -we cannot study the formal properties of probabilistic dependence separately from the probabilistic framework.
The Multiplication Law has been criticized by several authors. R. von Mises (1964) has argued that the Multiplication Law could be fulfilled just because of "pure numerical accidents", although A and B are not intuitively independent in the sense of 'being separated' or 'not influencing each other'. He gives an example where According to von Mises they are intuitively dependent (because they have B in common), whereas the Multiplication Law says that they are independent.
H. Reichenbach ( 1949) has argued that dependence and independence should be ternary rather than binary relations, where the third element in the relation is the evidence on which we declare that A and C are independent. From the ternary relation we can get back the binary one as follows:
A and Care independent if! there is some evidence E such that A and Care independent on evidence E. We do not treat ternary relations in the sequel except in the last section. Nevertheless our analysis carries over to the ternary case. In the rest of the section we formally present two important principles that are not validated by the Multiplication Law.
2 Conjunction and (in)dependence
A formal objection to the multiplication Law has been given by J. M. Keynes (1921 , cited in (Giirdenfors 1978 ).
According to Keynes, the following conjunction criterion for dependence (called conjunction criterion for relevance in (Giirdenfors 1978) ) should be valid:
(CCD) If C depends on A, and C depends on B then C depends on At\13.
He notes that (CCD) is not validated by the Multiplication
Law. Keynes proposes a stronger definition of probabilistic independence that does it: Cis independent of A iff there is noB such that A implies Band Prob(C I B) ;t:
Prob(C) . R. Carnap (1950) has shown that this definition leads to a trivial notion of independence: It entails that C depends on A as soon as C and A are consistent. Giirdenfors (1978) has suggested a conjunction criterion for independence dual to (CCD):
If C is independent of A, and C is independent of B then C is independent of AAB.
is a natural principle that should be valid. Gardenfors criticizes the Multiplication Law because it does not guarantee this principle, and investigates a series of stronger definitions of independence. He finally comes up with: C is independent of A iff Prob(A) == 0, or Prob(C I A A B ) = Prob(C)forall B such that Prob(AAB) > 0 and Prob(C I B) = Prob (C ) . This definition validates (CCI).
Note that Gardenfors' independence relation is non symmetric. Here we show that in an ordinal setting where uncertainty is described by ordering the states of the world by their plausibility, we capture similar regularities in terms of disjunction, in a much simpler way.
POSSIBILITY THEORY
We introduce the notions of possibility measure and distribution and of conditional possibility.
1 Possibility Measures
Possibility measures allow to associate an uncertainty degree to the elements of the set of events. Following e.g., Dubois and Prade (1986) In the finite case a possibility measure can be represented by a possibility distribution 1t on 0. the set of interpretations of the language. Namely IT(A) = sup{n{ro) I w I= A}. 1t encodes a complete partial ordering of interpretations, with the intended meaning that if n(ro)
> n(w'), ro is a more plausible description of the current situation than ro'. Reasoning in the setting of possibility theory comes down to assume that the current situation is always one of the most plausible ones. Accepting A (N(A) > 0) means that I1(A) > f1(-,A), i.e., that "normally A should be true". This way of modelling uncertainty is in full accordance with Shoham (1988) 's view of preferential logic, Lehmann (1989) 's notion of ranked models, also encoded in Pearl ( 1990) 's system Z. See (Benferhat et al. 1992 That these conditions are sufficient follows from the following formal relation between possibility theory and qualitative possibility orderings (Dubois 1986 ): The only functions mapping events into [0, 1] which strictly agree with qualitative possibility orderings are possibility measures, and a strictly agreeing possibility measure always exists. In our presentation of possibility theory, this result can be expressed as follows:
Theore m (soundness and completeness of qualitative possibility orderings). Let IT be any measure on n, and ;:: any binary relation on the subsets of n. Then IT is a possibility measure iff ;:: is a qualitative possibility ordering.
Conditional possibility relations first appear in Lewis (1973) 's logics of counterfactuals whose semantics are systems of spheres. But as indicated in Dubois and Prade (1991) a system of spheres is equivalent to a possibility distribution. Formal links between possibility theory and conditional logics are studied in Farinas del Cerro and Herzig (1991) . Lastly, the dual qualitative certainty relation, equivalent to necessity measures (A ;;>:N C iff ..., c ;:: -,A) is closely related to expectation-orderings of Gardenfors and Makinson (1994) . The characteristic axiom of ;:: N is (conjunctiveness)
2 Conditional Possibility
Following Hisdal ( 1978) and Dubois and Prade ( 1986, 
1992) the conditional possibility IT(CIA) is defined as the maximal solution of the equation IT(AAC) = min(fl(CIA), IT(A)). This definition is clearly inspired from Bayes'
Rule, where min corresponds to the product. The choice of the maximal solution is due to the principle of minimal specificity which urges to select the least committed possibility measures, i.e. the one which allows each event to have the greatest possibility level:
Some of these facts deserve some comments. Fact 1 suggests that nothing is sure when assuming that a certainly false proposition is true (since in this case anything and its contrary is plausible). This leads to the convention IT(False I False)= I which does not agree with the non-triviality axiom (it is not compulsory anyway). Fact 2 says that if A and C are fully consistent, assuming A true keeps C possibly true. Fact 3 says that a certainly false proposition remains false via conditioning by a non certainly false proposition. However if IT(A) = 0 then the conditional possibility again disagrees with the non triviality axiom.
In the next sections we present three different ordinal definitions of (in)dependence. Two of them are based on the notion of conditional possibility. We show that these two can express qualitative possibility, and that complete axiomatizations is given for one of them. We conjecture that this is not possible for the third one, originally due to Zadeh. In all three cases, a necessary condition for the independence of A and C will be that the conjunction AAC can be interpreted truth-functionally, in the sense that fl(AAC) =min (fl(A),fl(C)) for these particular events.
The conditional necessity is N(..., CIA) = 1 -IT(CIA), defined by duality. Note that N(CIA) = N(-,AvC) if N (CIA) > 0. The following property will be used at length in the sequel:
N(CIA) > 0 means that C is accepted as true when A is assumed to be true. It corresponds to the conditional assertion A tv C in the sense of Lehmann's rational inference, and can be viewed as the (nonmonotonic) plausible entailment of C from A in the presence of an ordering of interpretations. The above clearly show that A tv C means AAC is more plausible than AA..,C (or equivalently fi(AAC) > fl(AA..,C) in terms of possibility measure). Zadeh (1978) has introduced a symmetric definition of independence called "non-interactivity" between possibilistic variables that is not based on conditional possibilities.This notion has also been studied by Nahmias (1978) for events, under the name "unrelatedness".
(UN)RELA TED NESS
(Def ""z) A and Ca re related propositions in lildeh's sense (denoted by A ""z C) iff Il(AAC) * min(fi(A),fl(C)).
It is interesting to characterize the constraints induced by unrelatedness on the ordering of interpretations AAC, ..,AAC, AA..,C, ..., AA..,C respectively. On the contrary when A and C are unrelated the two propositions are totally allowed to be true together. Zadeh's independence is an extension of the logical notion of consistency. This notion is not very demanding. Moreover this notion is local in the sense that it is sensitive to negation: if A and C are unrelated, it does not say anything about the other literals ..,A and C, C and ..,A,
-,c and -,A, Other properties are as follows.
Facts.
(due to symmetry) 6. False ::tz A (where ::tz means "not(-=z ))" 7. True ::tz A 8. A ::tz A 9. A ::tz -,A iff IT(A) = 0 or I1(-,A) = 0 ; 10. AvC "1:-z A Facts 2 and 3 are disjunction-oriented. However, none of the two conjunction criteria (CCD) and (CCI) are valid with unrelatedness. Note also that facts 8 and 10 is certainly a strange property for an independence relation. There seems to be no way to express I1 by means of ""z, the reason being that we cannot express Il(A) = 1. Therefore, we conjecture that (just as for probabilistic independence) ""Z cannot be axiomatized alone.
STRONG INDEPENDENCE
It is tempting to define dependence in possibility theory in a way similar to probability theory, namely to define Ca s independent of A when the conditional measure of C given A is equal to the unconditional measure of C. Here we have two uncertainty functions I1 and N. Hence we can define independence as ITCCIA) = Il(C) or N(CIA) = N(C). Notice that N(CIA) = N(C) is equivalent to IJ(-,CIA) = Il(..., C). In (Farinas and Herzig 1994a) the independence relation defined by ITCCIA) = [l(C) is studied. A complete axiomatisation has been given.
Note that if Il(CIA) = Il(C) < 1 then we are in the situation where C is plausibly rejected (since fl(...,C ) = 1 > ITCC)). Hence the meaning of IT(CIA) = Il(C) < 1 is that when A is assumed to be true, it does not affect the plausible rejection of C. This expresses the negative statement that accepting ..., c is independent of A. It suggests to use N(CIA) = N(C) in order to express a positive statement. Note that we also have
but not the converse. Hence fl(-,CIA) = ITC•C) = 1 is a very weak statement saying that not accepting C (i.e. N(C) = 0) is not questioned by fact A. In particular, I1(CIA) = I1(C) = IJ(-,CIA) = Il(..., C) = 1 (which is never met in the probabilistic case), means that in the presence of A, C, which was originally ignored, is still ignored. In this paper we shall restrict to independence of accepted propositions with respect to other propositions; independence of ignored propositions turns out to be a very distinct issue, as suggested by the following result: In the next theorem we characterize a dependence relation "">=not("#>) without using conditional necessities.
Theorem (construction of ""> from IT). Let IT be a possibility measure, and let ""> be defined from its dual N through (Def"l:->). Corollary. Let IT be a possibility measure, and let => be defined from IT through (Def "1:-> ).
Fa cts. Let us comment on these facts. Facts 2 and 3 are similar to the (CCI) and (CCD) axioms except that disjunction is used instead of conjunction. Facts 1 and 4 are also similar but the conjunction of influenced facts is considered instead of influencing facts. Fact 5 means that assuming a contradiction holds destroys all previously plausible propositions. On the contrary tautologies never affect the plausibility of already plausible propositions (Fact 6). Fact 7 is simply due to the impossibility to assert false propositions. Fact 8 says that we can only assert a tautology is plausible when taking for granted an impossible proposition. Fact 9 and 10 express equivalent properties. Namely if A implies that C is false then when learning that A is true affects our opinion about C when C was previously supposed to be plausible. Fact 11 shows that the possibilistic ordering can be translated in terms of strong independence. Fact 12 claims that the only case when the truth of A is independent of itself is when A is a tautology. Fact 13 is a more general statement than fact 5. On the other hand, possibilistic dependence has some "nice" regularities such as 1., 2., 3., 4., none of which holds in the probabilistic case. These regularities are quite close to the criteria (CCD) and (CCI).
Concerning the expressivity of the dependence relation it is interesting to observe that it possesses the same expressivity as possibility theory itself. This follows from the next result.
Theorem (construction of TI from i:-> ). Let TI be a possibility measure, and let i:-> be defined from TI. 1. I1(A) >TI(C) iff AvC *>.C. 2. ITCA) :::: rrcq iff Ave""> ·A. Proof By previous fact II.
The theorem can be read as follows: C is strictly less possible than A if and only if learning that AvC is true does not change my rejection of C. The theorem should not be surprizing since the meaning of independence is to enforce constraints on the ordering between interpretations as shown in Proposition 4.1. It turns out that such constraints are enough to identify a single ordering, i.e. a comparative necessity relation.
Thus we are able to express qualitative possibility by means of strong independence. In a trivial manner, this correspondence enables us to obtain an axiomatization of the (in)dependence relation by translating the qualitative counterpart of possibility theory. No te that this is in contrast with probability theory: There, the independence relation cannot completely capture qualitative probability (which in turn determines the probability measure). Here we give a simpler axiomatization of"">:
( ""> 1) True *> True (o:> 2) A""> False Remark. It is important to note that => is quite close to a qualitative possibility ordering: Replacing A "='> C by TI(A) � TI (•C) all our principles are possibilistically valid. In particular (connectedness) can be deduced from the axioms: From('"" > 4) and("'> 5) we can get AvC =>·A or AvC => •C (see above). The other way round, the only (qualitative) axiom for �N that apparently does not follow from the above axioms is that of transitivity. As on the other hand we know by the above Corollary that A i:-> C implies TI(A) >TIC .... .C ), we obtain that for a given n. *> is a fragment of the We suppose given a theory K and an AGM revision operation * (Giirdenfors, 1988) . K* A represents the result of revising K by A. According to Gardenfors and Makinson's characterization theorem, K and * can be represented equivalently by an epistemic entrenchment ordering, which in turn is nothing else than a qualitative necessity ordering. It can be proved that in terms of possibility theory the fact that C belongs to K* A is equivalent to having N(CIA) > 0 ; moreover C belongs to K is equivalent to N(C) > 0. If we translate the definition of the weak independence relation #>w in terms of revision we get A #>w C iff C E K and C E K* A which is exactly Gardenfors' above requirement for revision-based independence. Clearly, a companion definition of a dependence relation "">-associated to a given qualitative necessity ordering can be defined via the following condition from a given AGM contraction operation (-):
(Cond ::=>-) A ::=>-C iff C E K and C tl: K-A iff N(C) > 0 and N(A) � N(AvC).
This alternative notion is studied in (Farinas and Herzig, 1994b) . The comparative analysis of revision-based and contraction-based notions of independence is beyond the scope of this paper.
COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION
We have analysed three notions of (in)dependence that can be defined in possibility theory. A common feature to all of them is that the independence of A and C requires that the conjunction of A and C is interpreted truth functionally. In other words, we have A :F> w BAC iff A :t> w B and A :F.> w C AvB :F-> w C iff A :t> w C and B :t> w C that is (DCI) and (CCI-r) with equivalence, due to Facts 3' and 4' of Section 5. This is natural if weak independence is considered in terms of belief revision: if we continue to accept BAC upon learning A we should continue to accept C and B as well.
We could have introduced as well a ternary dependence relation "B and C are independent, given A", as studied by Giirdenfors (1978 Giirdenfors ( , 1990 ) and Pearl ( 1988) . For reasons of simplicity we have restricted our analysis to binary dependence relations here, but it is clear that a ternary relation is certainly the most general one. This will be subject of further investigations.
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APPLICATION TO EXCEPTION TOLERANT REASONING
Possibility theory is a natural framework for handling nonmonotonic reasoning problems, because it embeds what Lehmann calls rational inference (see Benferhat et al., 1992) . Given a set of rules modelled by pairs of propositional formulas, it is possible to rank-order these exception-tainted rules in terms of their relative specificity. This ranking of rules generates an ordering of interpretations that can be encoded as a possibility distribution.
The algorithm for ranking rules (or interpretations) has been proposed by Lehmann, and also in a different form by Pearl. Benferhat et al. (1992) have shown that this ordering can be retrieved by means of the least specific possibility distribution that is consistent with the rules. The corresponding minimally specific ranking is such that IT*(pAI) = IT*(pA..., l), hence forbidding the conclusion that penguins have legs, despite the fact that the rule b l'v I is not involved in the conflict between penguins and birds with respect to flying. Several solutions have been suggested to solve this problem including maximal entropy rankings, lexicographic methods and others. Here we suggest that weak independence solves the problem.
Consider the graph induced by the rules of K.
Any Bayesian-oriented AI researcher would suggest that I is conditionally independent of p in the context of birds (which is clearly not true for f). This is intuitive as well:
If we learn that some bird is in fact a penguin, this does not influence our belief that it has legs. The conditional extension of weak independence reads N(llb) > 0 and N(llb/\p) > 0.
Here it leads to add the rule P-"b 1---I to K, i.e., to select another ranking of worlds that satisfies also 00-"P-"b) > Il(-.. 1-"P-"b) the level of priority of this rule will be the same as p 1---b and p 1----.f. It is clear then that from p and K u {p-"b 1---I} one can deduce I plausibly.
There is no space to develop this point in detail here.
However we plan to develop this methodology in the future (see, e.g. (Benferhat et al. 1994) we add a bird that has no legs (n) to the above knowledge base, with rules saying that n 1----.1, and n fv b, we can solve the problem by "reading on the graph" the proper conditional independence assertions while most other approaches would fail due to the presence of two conflicts.
However we cannot adapt the Bayesian methods readily for several reasons: here nodes of the graph are literals (not propositional variables), and cycles should be allowed (we must be able to say that "students are young" but "young people are not usually students"). Moreover there is no result that allow us to aggregate (via the min operation) a conditional possibility distribution into a global joint one (see, e.g., Fonck 1993) . A third reason is that the weak independence relation is non-symmetric, i.e will not be a 
